To reduce inefficiency and waste associated with care fragmentation, many current programs target greater clinical integration among physicians. However, these programs have led to only modest Medicare spending reductions. Most programs focus on formal integration, which often bears little resemblance to actual physician interaction patterns.
I npatient surgery costs vary widely across health systems. Many observers point to the fragmented nature of surgical care delivery as a driver of this variation. Suboptimal coordination among clinicians around the time of the surgical episode can affect health care spending by increasing the likelihood that clinical care team members provide duplicate tests, treatments, or services. Fragmentation also impedes the ability of physicians to identify imminent postoperative needs of patients after hospital discharge, resulting in emergency department visits and readmissions to the hospital. To address care fragmentation, payers and policy makers launched reforms such as accountable care organizations (ACOs) and the patient-centered medical home, which aim to improve clinical integration among physicians. 1, 2 However, the effects of ACOs and the patient-centered medical home on health spending have been modest. Although some evaluations demonstrate decreases in costs, others report no effect or even increases. [3] [4] [5] [6] A weakness of these programs and their evaluations is the focus on formal integration, understood as organizational structure, rules, and regulations. 7 Studies of social networks in organizations suggest that informal physician interaction patternsrelationships arising from the shared care of multiple patients over time-may be more consequential than formal structure for health system performance. [8] [9] [10] Because formal designs of health care reforms often fail to transfer to actual practice, examining informal physician interaction patterns may help clarify the potential value of improved clinical integration. We analyzed surgical episode payments for Medicare beneficiaries undergoing coronary artery bypass grafting (CABG) procedures. Using ideas from network analysis, we developed a new measure-the informal clinical integration indexthat characterized interactions among primary and specialty care physicians and examined how these interactions affected surgical episode payments. We hypothesized that greater informal clinical integration would be associated with lower episode payments. Our findings, which support this hypothesis, serve to inform health system administrators, policy makers, and researchers attempting to understand fragmentation between primary care and specialty care physicians.
Methods
Network analysts have developed techniques for characterizing interactions in social groups. 11 Use of these techniques has led to insights about the importance of informal interaction patterns inside formal organizations. 12-14 All networks share 2 building blocks: nodes and ties. Nodes represent people; ties represent interactions among those people. In our study, nodes represent the physicians who care for patients undergoing the CABG procedure (the surgical episode). Ties represent the patients shared between each physician pair. Previous research found that physicians who share patients are also more likely to share information. [15] [16] [17] The University of Michigan institutional review board deemed this study, which was based on deidentified data, to be exempt from its oversight.
Study Population
We used the Medicare Provider Analysis and Review (MedPAR) file 18 to identify beneficiaries 66 years or older who underwent CABG procedures between January 1, 2008, and December 31, 2011. This time frame immediately predated several national initiatives aimed at improving physician integration-including the Medicare Pioneer ACO Model, the Medicare Shared Savings Program, and the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services' Federally Qualified Health Center Advanced Primary Care Practice Demonstration-and allowed us to examine informal integration during a relatively stable period. We excluded beneficiaries who were not continuously enrolled in Medicare for 6 months before and 60 days after hospital discharge. Because of incomplete claims, we also excluded beneficiaries who had insurance through Medicare Advantage. The sample included 253 545 beneficiaries and 1186 health systems after implementing these criteria.
Mapping Physician Networks
Relevant physicians were identified using the Medicare Carrier file. 19 We determined each beneficiary's surgeon by iden-used the reverse of assortativity; thus, higher values (multiplied by 100) indicate improved integration, with the resulting coefficient ranging from −100 to 100. A network will have negative index values when physicians share more patients with colleagues in their own specialty; a network will have positive values when physicians share more patients with colleagues in different specialties. Lower connectivity across specialties may mean that communication among physicians overseeing different aspects of surgical care is weaker, possibly resulting in increased spending. Index calculations require information on physician specialties. We used Medicare specialty codes to categorize physicians as primary care, medical specialty care, or surgical specialty care. Radiologists and other specialists not directly involved with ongoing patient care were excluded. Details on the index are given in eAppendixes 1 and 2 in the Supplement.
Measuring the Efficiency of Surgical Care
To examine whether differences in informal integration may help explain surgical care spending, we extracted data on 60-day episode payments for surgical care of beneficiaries using the MedPAR, 18 Carrier, 19 and Outpatient 23 files. These payments reflect what Medicare actually paid for services rendered around CABG episodes. Although true costs may include more than payments, payments are an informative proxy. Following earlier studies, 24 we decomposed payments into physician services, index hospitalization, hospital readmission, and postacute care components. We standardized payment values to account for regional price differences. 25 
Statistical Analyses
For preliminary analyses, we stratified health systems into 3 equally sized groups (low, medium, and high) based on their level of informal integration. Informal clinical integration index values were (-26.05, 2.24) for 84 598 patients in the low group, (2.25, 4.73) for 84 442 patients in the medium group, and (4.74, 50.00) for 84 505 patients in the high group. We then made comparisons among these groups using Kruskal-Wallis tests. At the patient level, we compared groups on age, sex, race, and level of comorbid illness as measured by the Charlson Comorbidity Index. 26 Patient populations were also evaluated on socioeconomic factors, including income, educational level, and access to care. Comparisons at the health system level focused on size (ie, number of patients and physicians), the proportion of patients undergoing emergency surgery, academic affiliation using American Hospital Association data, 27 and diversity of physician specialties (as measured by a HerfindahlHirschman index over the distribution of primary care, medical specialty care, and surgical specialty care physicians, subtracted from 1 to capture diversity). We also compared formal structures of health systems by focusing on factors identified by organizational theorists as likely to influence interaction patterns. These measures captured technologic (ie, electronic health record implementation), institution (ie, government or for-profit control), organization (ie, affiliation with other physician organizations), and geographic (ie, number of physicians in a health system's physician network who practiced outside the region of the health system) structures. Finally, we looked for differences at the community level, defined as the hospital service area of the health system. Using the American Community Survey 28 and Dartmouth Atlas data, 29 we compared surgeon, primary care physician, medical specialist, and hospital bed availability. We also compared communities on the size of their black, Hispanic, and overall populations. The next analyses used multivariate regression to assess whether payments varied with informal physician integration. The patient was defined as the unit in regressions, but we measured networks at the health system level. Therefore, we estimated multilevel models with health system random effects and clustered standard errors. Models also included year-fixed effects. The outcomes were price-adjusted, episode payment components and the predictor was informal clinical integration. Confounders were controlled at the patient, health system, and community levels using the variables shown in the Table. We postulated that our hypothesis would be supported if we found negative and statistically significant associations between informal clinical integration and price-adjusted, episode payment components.
To evaluate the strength of our findings, we performed sensitivity analyses, which are discussed in eAppendix 3 (which references eTables 1-7) in the Supplement. Our analyses were performed using Stata SE, version 13.1 (StataCorp LLC). Statistical tests were 2-tailed and used a 2-sided 0.05 as the type I error probability.
Results
The total 253 545 study participants included 175 520 men (69.2%; mean [SD] years) (P < .001). We found that the informal clinical integration index varied across health systems. The index captures the degree of interaction among primary and specialty care physicians. The lowest value observed on our index was −26.05 (relatively low integration); the highest was 50.00 (improved integration). The mean (SD) was 3.74 (3.13). A histogram is shown in eFigure 1 in the Supplement. Figure 1 plots relationships among physicians at 2 health systems: A and B. Colored nodes represent physicians and type of medical training. Green nodes are primary care physicians, yellow nodes are medical specialists, and blue nodes are surgical specialists. Red ties indicate relationships across specialties and gray ties indicate relationships within specialties. The health systems serve comparable markets in the Midwestern United States. Similar numbers of physicians (70 physicians in health system A and 89 in health system B) have similar numbers of ties.
The health systems differ in terms of informal clinical integration. With an index value of −9.02, physicians are less con-nected across specialties in health system A. Approximately 59.1% of the 561 ties between physicians in this health system are cross-specialty. By contrast, with an index value of 10.09, integration is higher at health system B. Approximately 72.7% of ties among physicians are cross-specialty. More information on these cross-specialty ties is given in eFigure 2 in the Supplement.
The Table compares [1.76] ; P < .001). These descriptive findings suggest that health systems that treat more disadvantaged populations, particularly urban minority populations, also tend to be less informally integrated.
Our next analyses examined associations between informal integration and payments. After adjusting for patient, Figure 2 by the integration tercile groups. Figure 3 compares estimated payments for the 4 components among health systems with high levels of integration relative to low levels. Regression coefficients are shown in eTable 1 in the Supplement. Although health systems with higher integration have better performance on all 4 components, savings are most pronounced for hospital readmission and postacute care. We observe that health systems in the high integration group have estimated payments that are 13.03% lower for hospital readmission and 5.82% lower for postacute care than the low integration group. Consider that roughly 250 000 CABG procedures are performed annually in the United States. Assuming these procedures were done by health systems with high informal integration, we would expect savings of $130.5 million on hospital readmissions relative to what we would expect if the procedures were done by health systems with low informal integration. The corresponding expected savings on postacute care is $108.5 million. For total episode payments (not shown in Figures 2 or 3) , the expected savings are $640 277 500 annually.
Discussion
Our findings demonstrate variability across health systems regarding how much primary care and specialty physicians interact among shared patients. This variability is associated with surgical care episode payments. In health systems with greater informal integration, we observed lower spending on CABG procedures, with the greatest savings on payments for hospital readmissions and postacute care. These findings held even after accounting for patient, health system, and community differences. These results support the idea that better informal integration of physicians during surgical care may improve patient coordination and lead to greater efficiency.
This study contributes to the understanding of integrated care delivery. To date, research has focused on the associations of formal integration with outcomes; for instance, bringing hospitals and physician groups under the same health system. However, studies of social networks in organizations caution that formal structures often fail to transfer to informal interaction patterns. Although formal organization helps support coordination across groups, there is no guarantee that it will bring people together. Qualitative research on ACOs suggests that understandings of integration vary among early adopters and that, in some cases, adoption appears to have increased informal integration; in others, changes have been minimal. 30 The informal integration index offers a way of differentiating among groups that have adopted similar formal approaches to integration but that may still differ in terms of interaction among specialties. This study suggests that health systems may be able to improve their performance through deeper informal integration. Within the surgical care environment, identifying the best ways to promote informal integration is a promising area for future work. Based on research in other domains, administrators may see benefits by eliminating physical barriers between primary care physicians and medical and surgical specialists (eg, through colocalization of clinics). 32, 33 Where these barriers cannot be eliminated, administrators may consider incentivizing physicians to use emerging health information technologies that promote collaboration, or to organize events that bring physicians from different specialties together (eg, multidisciplinary case conferences), thereby growing metaknowledge of "who knows what" within their health systems.
Strengths and Limitations
Readers should view these findings in the context of several limitations. Although our models controlled for many confounders, unmeasured factors may bias the results. Our models may not sufficiently capture differences in the medical condition of patients prior to CABG procedure. In eAppendix 3 in the Supplement, we show that the findings are robust to additional adjustments for patient complexity. However, future work may better measure disease severity by linking Medicare claims data to other sources (eg, the Society of Thoracic Surgeons National Database) 34 with more rigorous risk adjustments. Findings may also be biased if more progressive health systems promote integration around surgical care and take other unmeasured steps to reduce spending. Administrative data allow us to examine differences across many health systems over time, which would be prohibitive with other methods. Our reliance on administrative data may have omitted some important relationships (eg, curbside consultations) and health care professionals (eg, advanced practice clinicians) from our maps of health system networks while including others considered less important. Although anesthesiologists are sometimes deeply involved with postoperative management of cardiac surgery patients, we excluded them from our physician networks because we could not distinguish postoperative anesthesiology care from anesthesiology care delivered in the operating room. In eAppendixes 2 and 3intheSupplement, we address some potential concerns regarding the construction of network maps using statistical methods and simulations; results of which add confidence to the findings. Validation studies also offer support for our approach. In 1 analysis, 15 physicians were surveyed about their professional relationships. Responses from this survey were matched to Medicare claims. Surveyed physicians recognized up to 82% of claims-based relationships. A different study, using a similar approach, found that network measures based on claims were associated with perceptions of care team climate, as reported in surveys. 35 Assuming that the structure of omitted relationships does not vary systematically from those observed, these findings suggest bias should be minimal in our results.
Implications
Our study has several policy implications. The findings suggest that health system administrators and policy makers may benefit from viewing formal and informal clinical integration as 2 distinct phenomena. Although programs such as ACOs and patientcentered medical homes may improve formal coordination, it is possible that their influence over physicians' informal relationships is limited. Put differently, programs that aim to deepen integration through formal means may be acting at the tip of the iceberg while leaving many informal, subsurface connections untouched. Our findings also suggest the possibility that informal integration may contribute to the success or failure of formal programs aimed at reducing fragmentation. Imagine that health systems A and B in Figure 1 adopted identical programs designed to incentivize coordination among primary and specialty care physicians. One year after implementation, evaluations demonstrated some improvements at health system B but not at health system A. Although we may be surprised to see different outcomes at comparable health systems, these results make sense when we see that informal integration is initially far lower at health system A.
Our index of informal integration may prove useful for health system administrators and researchers. The index can be easily calculated using administrative claims. The index's normalized −100 to 100 range helps facilitate comparisons across health systems. These features suggest that the index may be valuable as a diagnostic tool for identifying clinics, departments, institutions, or partnerships that are ripe for interventions aimed at improving care relations among specialists.
Conclusions
This study drew on insights from network analysis to develop a novel index that characterizes informal integration among primary care and specialty physicians within health systems. Greater informal integration was associated with lower episode payments for CABG procedures. Although most programs that seek to promote clinical integration are focused on health systems' formal structures, policy makers may also want to address informal integration. Role of the Funder/Sponsor: The funding organization had no role in the design and conduct of the study; collection, management, analysis, and interpretation of the data; preparation, review, or approval of the manuscript; and decision to submit the manuscript for publication. Surgery uses a network analysis to assess informal physician integration that arises from the shared care of multiple patients over time. They hypothesized that higher levels of informal integration would produce price-standardized total episode and component payments that were lower than those observed in health systems with lower indices. Their analysis supported the inference that deeper informal integration is associated with lower spending, specifically when related to readmissions and postacute care services, and that this difference might explain the limited efficacy of formal integration as mandated in accountable care organizations or patient-centered medical homes.
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The authors contend that voluntary collaboration between practitioners of different specialties is more efficacious than mandatory cooperation (accountable care organizations, patientcentered medical homes). This result is not surprising to the experienced clinician. The authors developed an interesting new and measurable performance metric (informal integration) and made a relatively rigorous attempt to provide quantitative support for this intuitive observation. Have they succeeded?
Inherent in this study that uses claims-based data is the inability to correlate the financial with either short-term or longterm clinical outcomes in the patients who were examined. Ironically, the authors chose to examine coronary artery bypass graft surgery, a procedure for which the Society of Thoracic Surgeons Cardiac Surgery Database offers clinical information on millions of patients and that has been cited to illustrate the limitations in measurements based on claims. Perhaps there is an uncomfortable circularity to the reasoning at the heart of this analysis. Specifically, this study depends on claims data to develop a new method for stratifying a group of patients and then uses this stratification to examine differences in claims for the care of this same group of patients. Finally, the authors do not have any data to support the contention that the enhanced integration that was observed in the high-integration/lower-cost group of patients was, in fact, informal. It is conceivable that this result was achieved with formal integration, although at a more local level than is achievable by an accountable care organization or a patientcentered medical home. Care Pathways and their accompanying standardized order sets have been linked to improved outcomes and perhaps shorter lengths of stay. 2 Or perhaps using postdischarge strategies, such as telephone contact or in-home nurse visits, could have resulted in decreased readmissions and use of postacute services. One also must wonder whether the beneficial informal integration as proposed by the authors will persist in the age of hospitalists, intensivists, and the absence of primary care clinicians in hospitals. This supplementary material has been provided by the authors to give readers additional information about their work.
eAppendix 1. Informal Clinical Integration Index
We calculated our index of informal integration using a version of the assortativity coefficient designed for nominal features (e.g., physician specialties). This measure corresponds to the proportion of relationships between physicians of the same type, minus proportion of such relationships that would be expected if relationships were formed at random without regard to specialty. Mathematically, the coefficient is defined as , where e is a matrix, with elements e ij , that correspond to the fraction of edges that connect a type i node to a type j node, , , and . 1 When r = 0, there is no assortative mixing. As discussed in the main text, we reverse the index so that positive values correspond to higher integration across specialties within health systems.
eAppendix 2. Assessing the Influence of Network Structure on the Informal Clinical Integration Index
The findings reported in this study are based on the assumption that values of the informal clinical integration index we observe within and across health systems reflect meaningful differences in interaction patterns among physicians. Within this context, a potential concern is that our index is artificially influenced by some underlying property of physician network structures, and therefore does not characterize meaningful interaction patterns.
To evaluate this possibility, we ran simulations on a sample of health system networks from our data. In these simulations, we randomly shuffled ties between physicians in the observed network, while maintaining two key structural characteristics. First, we shuffled ties in such a way that we maintained the same number of shared patients between provider types. For example, if in the observed network there were 30 heart bypass surgery patients shared between primary care providers and surgeons, we made sure that there were also 30 of these patients shared between primary care providers and surgeons in the shuffled networks. Second, we made sure that physicians shared the same overall number of patients in both the observed and shuffled networks. Note, however, that these patients may be shared with a different number of physicians.
For health system × year observations in our data, we created 100 shuffled versions of the observed network. Our choice of 100 was based on computational considerations and precedent in related, prior work. 2 After each shuffling, we recorded the informal clinical integration index for the shuffled network. Once all simulation runs were complete, we averaged the 100 values of the informal clinical integration by health system × year and compared this average to the observed value, using a z score. We found that index values of the shuffled networks differed significantly from the observed networks. As a summary indicator, we averaged the z scores obtained for individual health system × year observations. The P-value associated with this average z score was <0.001. This result helps to confirm that observed values of the integration index are not artificially driven by some underlying property of the physician network structures.
eAppendix 3. Sensitivity Analyses
We ran additional analyses in which we evaluated the sensitivity of the models presented in eTable 1 to different specifications.
First, we attempted to determine whether "false positive" relationships between pairs of physicians that share very few patients over the course of a calendar year may have influenced our findings. To eliminate weak ties, we used the threshold approach introduced by Landon and colleagues. 3 Specifically, for each provider, we kept the strongest 20 percent of his or her connections and dropped the others. This threshold helps to "maintain intrinsic network characteristics while also eliminating noise that might result from spurious connections…and therefore [prioritizes] the relationships likely to be most influential to physicians" 3 Our results using this approach were substantively similar to those presented in the main text.
Second, although the regression models reported in the main text account for many potential confounding factors, our findings are nevertheless vulnerable to omitted variable bias. In supplementary models, shown in eTable 2, we therefore reran our analyses with health system fixed effects. By leveraging within health system variation, these models account for all time invariant confounding factors. Although still potentially subject to omitted variable bias, these models are more conservative than those presented in the main text. As shown in eTable 2, our findings are substantively similar.
Third, our sample includes several smaller health systems that perform very few CABG procedures each year. These health systems may be systematically different from larger health systems that are better equipped for providing CABG care. To determine whether these small health systems were influencing our findings, we reran our regressions, but only including health systems that, within a calendar year, performed greater than or equal to 20 CABG procedures. The results, shown in eTable 3, are supportive of our main findings.
Fourth, our core models control for patient complexity using the Charlson comorbidity index and an indicator for whether the beneficiary underwent CABG surgery following and urgent or emergency hospital admission. Nevertheless, these measures may fail to capture some relevant differences in case mix severity. As a further check on our findings, we ran additional models that substituted the sum of the Elixhauser 4 comorbidity index categories and the Elixhauser comorbidity index categories for the Charlson control. These results, shown in eTables 4 and 5, respectively, are supportive of our findings.
Fifth, given that early mortality after CABG may be a marker for more severe cardiac disease and worse case severity, we reran our models on the subset of beneficiaries that survived more three days post-procedure. Our findings, shown in eTable 6, were robust to this alternative specification. Finally, to evaluate for possible nonlinearity in our models of informal clinical integration, we ran supplemental analyses that use categories of low, medium, and high integration based on values of the continuous index. Consistent with our comparisons across groups in the main text, the integration index values were [-26.05, 2.24] for the low group (n=84,598), [2.25, 4 .73] for the medium group (n=84,442), and [4.74, 50 .00] for the high group (n=84,505). Models in eTable 7 include indicator variables for the medium and high groups; the low group serves as the reference category. Findings using this alternative approach are substantively consistent with those presented in the main text. 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.07 † All models include year fixed effects (coefficients not shown) and health system random effects. ¶ The reference category is low informal clinical integration. ‡ The reference category is other races. Standard errors are in parentheses (+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001).
